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ABSTR AC T
In view  o f th e  iron ies  o f th e  rea lisa tion  o f th e  dem ocratic idea l, w hich 
o ften  do no t answer to  the  exaggera ted  expecta tions o f th e  p a rt ic ip a n ts , 
th e  idea o f th e  regstaat is inve s tig a te d  as an "o v e r r id in g  pu rpose  o r  
tran sce n d in g  va lue" fo r  re fo rm  in South A fr ic a . Im po rta n t facets emerge 
w ith  re g a rd  to  th e  concept o f th e  regstaat in  th e  legal and p o lit ica l 
developm ent o f th e  Greeks and Romans w ith  th e  in s titu t io n a liz a tio n  o f the  
idea th a t th e  sta te  is a res publica, and espec ia lly  the  in fluence  o f the  
Roman ius gentium is v is ib le  in the  legal and p o lit ic a l developm ent in 
Western Europe via the  recep tion  o f Roman law in  the  developm ent o f the  
modern d iffe re n tia te d  c iv i l  law which is based on th e  fundam ental human 
r ig h ts  o f c iv i l  freedom  and e q u a lity  (independen t o f n a tio n a lity , p u b lic  
legal s ta tu s , race, re lig io n  e tc .)  o f all people and a ll societal form s w ith in  
the te r r i to r y  o f the s ta te . A s tu d y  o f the  developm ent o f the  regstaat 
in  England ind ica tes th a t the  in s titu tio n a liz a tio n  o f the concept o f ru le  
o f law developed d u r in g  the  "G lo rious R evo lu tion " p r io r  to  the  actual 
developm ent o f the  in d iv id u a l p o litica l r ig h t  o f the  English  c it ize n . 
T h ro u g h  th is  i t  becomes c lea r th a t the  in s titu tio n a liz a tio n  o f the  regstaat 
is not necessarily  dependent on dem ocracy. While the  idea o f democracy 
stresses p o lit ica l freedom  and p a rt ic ip a tio n , the  concept o f ru le  o f law 
goes much fu r th e r  and encompasses not o n ly  the  sphere o f p u b lic  law 
(w ith in  w hich p o lit ica l r ig h ts  co n s titu te  a p a r t)  b u t also the  sphere of
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c iv i l  law and the  cu rta ilm e n t o f the pow er o f governm ent w ith  respect to  
the  sphere  o f in te rn a l ju r is d ic t io n  o f the  non -s ta te  societal fo rm s. Be­
cause o f the problem s w hich re fo rm  in South A fr ic a  faces, th e  emphasis 
on p o lit ic a l p a rt ic ip a tio n  fo r  the  immediate fu tu re  can be 
c o u n te r-p ro d u c tiv e  fo r  the  in s titu tio n a liz a tio n  o f the  re g s ta a t. The 
concept o f the  re g s ta a t w h ich has to  be inco rp o ra ted  in a dec la ra tion  
o f in te n t w ill l in k  re fo rm  in  South A fr ic a  to  c r ite r ia  o f freedom  w hich 
should be acceptable to  all g roups  and in d iv id u a ls . W ith the  concept o f 
the  re g s ta a t as an ideal o f re fo rm  w hich should also gu ide  the  immediate 
re fo rm s o f the p re se n t governm ent, negotia tions can be conducted  in  a 
more re laxed  and less po la rized  s itu a tio n  - hon es tly  and op e n ly , no t on ly  
w ith  re g a rd  to  its  in s titu tio n a liz a tio n  b u t also w ith  reg a rd  to  an even tua l 
time schedule.
1. INTRODUCTION
The rea lisa tion  th a t th e re  are no in s ta n t so lu tions o r magical form ulas fo r  
the  v e ry  complex problem s w hich re n d e r the South A fr ica n  socie ty  un ique 
tends to  keep academics humble. The role of an academic cannot be th a t 
o f a p o lit ica l c rac le  o r  of a p ro p h e t. We can at most a ttem pt to  ind ica te  
the main tre n d s  and o ffe r  an ind ica tion  o f possib le  ways th a t can be 
taken. The problem s w hich we experience  in o u r socie ty  w ith  rega rd  to  
the  in p u ts  made by  academics have been ou tlin e d  s t r ik in g ly :
"Many are in the r in g -s id e  seats who all ye ll advice , w ith  a lo t o f 
p laye rs  on the fie ld  who p lay  as i f  they  do not unders tand  the ru les 
o f the game - o r  all in re a lity  p la y in g  d if fe re n t  games w ith  th e ir  
own ru les  and p re s c r ip tio n s "  (W iechers, 1985:15).
In the  l ig h t  o f th is  th e  task of academics can be seen as a c la r if ic a tio n  
both of the  ru les of the  game and the  typ e  of game, w hich w ill not on ly  
make the  game run  more sm oothly b u t w hich w ill also c o n tr ib u te  to  the 
prom otion o f the  sa fe ty  of a ll th e  teams and p la ye rs . In line  w ith  th is , 
th is  a rt ic le  is an a ttem pt to  look a t, espec ia lly , re form  in South A fr ic a  
and, in c o n tra s t to  the c lichéd  concept of democracy (and w ith o u t
- 111-
ch u ck in g  ou t the baby w ith  the bath w a te r) in v e s tig a tin g  th e  idea o f the 
re g s ta a t2 as an "o v e rr id in g  purpose  o r transce n d in g  va lue" (Giliomee, 
1982:154) in terms o f the  reform  process in  South A fr ic a . From a com­
parison  of the reform s implemented from  above in csa ris t Russia (from  
the lib e ra tio n  of the se rfs  in 1861 by Czar A lexander II to  th e  revo lu tion  
o f 1917) w ith  the s ty le  o f reform  of the Botha regime in South A fr ic a , 
i t  seems th a t an im portan t s im ila r ity  is s itua ted  in the  absence o f a c le a rly  
de lineated ideal o f re fo rm . What Giliomee said about the  s ty le  of six years 
ago is p ra c tic a lly  ve rba tim  app licab le  to  today:
" In  a series of speeches in 19/9 Botha tr ie d  to  leg itim ise  his 
prom ised reform s by  espousing a b lend o f fibe ra l (A fr ik a n e r )  
nationalism  and un ive rsa l C h r is t ia n ity .  What he d id  not was to spell 
ou t c le a rly  w hat th e  p o litica l goals o f these reform s were. I t  is 
to  be doubted  w he ther he h im self has c la r ity  about such po litica l 
goals. As in the  case of the Russian reform  from  above th is  has 
crea ted  the  im pression th a t the  reform s would be implemented 
m ainly to  increase state power and m ilita ry  e ffic ie n c y . And as in 
the  case o f Russia the  absence of p o litica l goals means th a t the re  
e x is ts  no y a rd s tic k  by  w hich p rog ress tow ards some ideals of re ­
fo rm  can be ju d g e d " (G iliomee, 1982:154-155).
The f i r s t  p a rt of the  d iscussion w ill cen tre  on the concept of the  reg s ta a t 
and th e  reasons w hy i t  is to  be p re fe r re d  to  the  concept o f democracy. 
Follow ing th is  a tte n tio n  is d irec te d  to  the  options ava ilab le  on the  road 
o f re fo rm  as well as the  th o rn s  and the  th is tle s  w hich are sca tte red  across 
the  road. F ina lly  a tte n tio n  is d irec te d  to the p o ss ib ilitie s  w h ich ex is t 
to  overcome these problem s w hich beset the  in s titu tio n a lis a tio n  o f the  
re g s ta a t in South A fr ic a .
2. REGSTAAT VERSUS DEMOCRACY
The te rm  reg s ta a t w ill be used co n s is te n tly  because the  nearest 
Eng lish  equ iva le n t, w hich is ru le  o f  law does not convey the  iden tica l 
m eaning, as w ill emerge from  the  te x t.
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2.1 The iron ies  o f the  concept of democracy
In his su rv e y  of the  more recen t c o n tr ib u tio n s  in the  fie ld  o f com parative 
p o litica l science, In g le h a rt is o f the opin ion (1983:433) th a t research in 
th is  fie ld  has since the  Second W orld War been con fro n te d  w ith  the  cen tra l 
issue: "What are the  cond itions u nder w hich democracy can su rv ive ? " 
While th is  question  dea ling  w ith  p a rtic ip a tio n  (who rules? o r  who p a r t ic ­
ipates and w hy?) is the f i r s t  question  to  be asked in the p o litica l sc i­
ences, the  second question  is why? (w hat social bonds, ob jec tives and 
values m otiva te  people to  p a rtic ip a te ? ) A p a rt from  these two issues (in  
w hich two o f the  th re e  u n d e r ly in g  va riab les  and accompanying research 
d ire c tio n s  in w hich he focuses in his su rve y  emerge) th e re  is the  th ird  
ty p e  o f va riab le  concern ing  the s tru c tu ra l fa c to rs  (p o litic a l and economic 
in s t itu t io n s  o f a p a rt ic u la r  soc ie ty) w hich de term ine p o litica l behav iou r 
and events .
While in his su rv e y  o f the  lite ra tu re  on p o litica l p a rtic ip a tio n  especia lly  
th e  d is t in c tio n  between the o ld e r é lite -d ire c te d  and the  newer 
é lite -opposed  p a rtic ip a tio n  is h ig h lig h te d , he po in ts  o u t th a t in the  l i t ­
e ra tu re  dea ling  w ith  p o litica l d iv is io n s  the  b u rn in g  issue concern ing  the  
in fluence  o f class d iffe re n c e  as opposed to  so-ca lled  e th n ic  ( re lig io u s , 
l in g u is t ic  o r  rac ia l) d iffe re n c e  is s t i l l  to p ica l. He is also o f the  op in ion 
th a t concepts th a t have to  do w ith  lo n g -te rm  o rie n ta tio n s  ( id e n tif ic a tio n  
w ith  p a rtie s  o r  p o lit ic a l c u ltu re )  w ould s t i l l  be o f g re a t in te re s t in  any 
exp lica tion  o f p o lit ica l behav iou r ( th e  reason w h y  people p a rtic ip a te  p o l­
i t ic a l ly ) .  W ith reg a rd  to  the  th ird  c e n tra l va ria b le , v iz .  s tru c tu ra l fa c ­
to rs , he po in ts  o u t th a t the  question  "Who p a rtic ip a te s  in p o lit ic s ? ", 
w h ich is one o f the  c e n tra l issues o f p o lit ica l b e h av iou r, is o n ly  mean­
in g fu l i f  th e  assum ption upon w hich bo th  mass and é lite  research is based 
is c o rre c t, v iz .  th a t those who p a rtic ip a te  p ro b a b ly  w ill g e t w hat they 
des ire  o r  w hat th e y  are supposed to  des ire :
"T h is  is the  u ltim ate  'So what? ' ques tion ; Does po litica l p a r t ic ­
ipa tion  make any d iffe rence?  Does i t  re s u lt in a h ig h e r share of 
the  nationa l income, o r  a h ig h e r life  expectancy fo r  the  g iven  
group? Does it  in fluence  p u b lic  p o lic y , b r in g in g  it  c loser to  the 
g iven  g ro u p 's  goals?" ( In g le h a r t,  1983:454).
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A bout th is  issue, as well as the con trove rs ies  about the  p o s s ib ility  of 
democracy in a ca p ita lis t soc ie ty , the ways of the  au thors  d iv e rg e . The 
au tho rs  who feel th a t economic developm ent is a cond ition  fo r  a stable 
democracy, accord ing to  In g le h a rt, assume autom atica lly th a t democracy 
is a good th in g . He poses the question , however, w he ther " i t  (does 
make) any d iffe re n ce , in terms o f economic e q u a lity , o r  m ight democracy 
be in te rp re te d  as a sham, from  a p u re ly  m ate ria lis tic  v iew po in t? " 
(1983:456). A cco rd ing  to him w r ite rs  have po in ted  ou t th a t, in sp ite  of 
the  coherence between economic developm ent on the one hand and eq u a lity  
in term s of income and the presence o f democracy on the  o th e r hand, the 
coherence between democracy and e q u a lity  d isappears when the level of 
economic developm ent is taken in to  cons ide ra tion . I t  is in th is  rega rd  
th a t Schlemmer (1978) ta lks  of a ce rta in  iro n y  in libe ra l-dem ocra tic  p o li­
tica l forms w h ich , i f  they demand what amounts to  consensus on u n d e r­
ly in g  in te re s ts  as a cond ition  fo r  th e ir  establishm ent and co n tin u ing  
ex is tence, and if  th is  consensus in tu rn  demands shared w ea lth , the 
immediate relevance o f dem ocratic form s becomes prob lem atic  fo r  most o f 
the  areas o f the  w o rld . The basic antagonism s o f soc ie ty  cannot be 
reconciled , because th e ir  n e u tra lis in g  is a cond ition  fo r  th e  success of 
the  dem ocracy. T h is  n e u tra lis in g , w hich is p a r t ly  obta ined th ro u g h  the 
crea tion  and sa tis fac tion  o f unnecessary consumer needs o f bo red , com­
p lacent Western popu la tions, conceals the  c o n tro llin g  power o f é lites en ­
jo y in g  a u n ila te ra l freedom , p rec ise ly  because c rit ic is m  is b locked b y  the 
autom atic assumptions about dem ocracy. In  his su rve y  o f the  theories 
o f democracy Macpherson (1984) c r it ic is e s , in con junction  w ith  th is , 
p rec ise ly  th e  e q u ilib riu m  th e o ry  of the  tw e n tie th  c e n tu ry  (w ith  its  na rrow  
d e fin it io n  o f democracy as a mechanism fo r  the  e lection and the 
a u tho risa tio n  of a governm ent) w hich excludes the  idea of democracy as 
a k in d  of socie ty in which the eq u a lity  o f chances needed fo r  a fu ll human 
life  is den ied.
I t  is in th is  th a t Schlemmer fin d s  the reason fo r  the  w illingness o f many 
researchers in the f ie ld  of developm ental stud ies to  defend the m erits  of 
w ha teve r poss ib ilitie s  of po litica l p a rtic ip a tio n  "p ro g re s s iv e " o n e -p a rty  
states m ight o ffe r  in the T h ird  W orld. I t  can even be a rgued th a t a 
cons ide ra tion  of the  developm ent o f South A fr ica  should not in vo lve  a 
concern fo r  "freedom  and dem ocracy", b u t p r im a r ily  a concern w ith  the 
red iv is io n  o f the  m ateria l resources o r s im ply w ith  a s h if t  o f power away
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from  th e  W hite m in o r ity . A lth o u g h  Schlemmer accepts th e  u n d e rly in g  
im portance o f these co n s ide ra tions , he is ju s t  as hes itan t to  do his 
ana lys is  o f th e  developm ent in South A fr ic a  w ith o u t any refe rence  to  the  
ideals o f a dem ocratic soc ie ty .
"W hatever its  iro n ies , th e  dem ocratic ideal is d i f f ic u lt  to  lose s ig h t 
o f even in  the  m urk  o f th e  T h ird  W orld 's prob lem s. The constan t 
apology to  these ideals in  p o lit ica l nom enclature is com pelling - 
People's dem ocracies', 'G uided dem ocracies', 'O ne -P a rty  democra­
c ies ’ and th e  lik e  are  all ev idence o f th e  w o r ld ’s d iscom fo rt in  the  
face o f these idea ls" (Schlemmer, 1978:122).
The in fla t io n  in  meaning w hich th e  te rm  democracy has undergone, how­
e v e r, has th e  e ffe c t th a t i t  is a p p ro p ria te d  b y  le f t ,  ce n tre  and r ig h t  to  
p ro v id e  leg itim acy to  th e ir  spe c ific  rep resen ta tions  re g a rd in g  p o litic s  and 
the  even tua l im plementation o f these rep re se n ta tio n s . In  th is  way the  
German Democratic R epub lic , th e  East German s ta te  has a p p ro p ria te d  the  
name fo r  i ts e lf  in th e  same fash ion  as any o f th e  o th e r peoples' democ­
racies (w ith  o r  w ith o u t th e  Moscow conn ec tio n ). O ve r aga inst th is  v iew  
o f dem ocracy, as o f one -m an-one-vo te , th e re  is th e  approach in South 
A fr ic a  of th e  "V o lk s s ta a t", w here each man has a vo te , b u t on ly  and 
s t r ic t ly  w ith in  the closed c u ltu ra l com m unity o f w h ich  he is a member:
"V a rious  peoples ( "v o lk e " )  w hich live  in the  same c o u n try  cannot 
a ll ru le . U nder a tru e  dem ocracy, how ever, th e  supreme power 
goes to  the  people ( " v o lk " )  who can m aster 50® p lus one o f the 
votes . . . "  (S abra , 1985:12).
Somewhere between the  one-m an-one-vo te  and the  "one -peop le -one -s ta te " 
dem ocratic ideals th e re  is the  e f fo r t  tow ards consociation democracy in 
th e  new c o n s titu tio n a l d isp o s itio n , w h ich can r ig h t ly  be described  as 
"sham consocia tion" (H an f, et al. 1981:408). The idea o f the  ru le  o f law 
w h ich  is posited  in th is  paper as an a lte rn a tiv e  fo r  the  fa lse dilemma 
posed by one-m an-one-vo te  and one -peop le -one -s ta te , does not im ply th a t 
the  idea o f consocia tive  democracy escapes th is  dilemma, seeing th a t in 
an e th n ic a lly  d iv id e d  socie ty i t  bo ils down to a compromise between these 
two extrem es, to  the idea o f o n e -n a tio n -o n e -vo te  o r -ve to  democracy. 
C onsocia tive  democracy is also not free  o f the  iron ies  h ig h lig h te d  above.
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Witile the  term  to ta l i t a r ia n  democracy (Talm on, 1952) seems like  a 
c o n tra d ic t io  in  a d je c t iv a , the term  "p a r t ic ip a to ry  dem ocracy" (HSRC, 
1985:172) attem pts on the  one hand to  f in d  a way th ro u g h  th is  la b y r in th  
of meanings, b u t can on the o th e r hand also seem to  be tau to log ica l, 
because po litica l p a rtic ip a tio n  ( in  w hatever fo rm , by  whomever) is p re ­
c ise ly  the g rea tes t common fa c to r w hich emerges in all the  uses o f the 
term  democracy. In th a t p rec ise ly  do the users of the  term  fin d  the 
leg itim is in g  c h a ra c te r is tic :
"Seeing th a t the  concept democracy today is accepted p ra c tic a lly  
u n iv e rs a lly  as a p rin c ip le  of po litica l leg itim acy, all k inds o f dem­
o c ra tic a lly  d o u b tfu l regimes are forced to  base th e ir  claims to  le ­
g itim acy on claims o f democracy. The p ra c tica l re su lt o f th is  is 
th a t the  democracy label is e ith e r used w ith o u t fin e  d is tin c tio n  so 
th a t i t  becomes m eaningless, o r i t  is ad justed to  such an e x te n t 
to  accommodate claims th a t i t  becomes p ra c tic a lly  unrecogn izab le" 
(Faure  and K rie k , 1984:33).
To b reak th ro u g h  th is  c irc u lu s  v it io s u s  o f views o f democracy and 
concepts o f leg itim acy which cover fo r  each o th e r m u tu a lly , one should 
pay a tte n tio n  to  ano the r lin k  in the  chain o f m eaning, v iz . th e  concept 
o f s ta te  u n d e r ly in g  th e  v iew . An e f fo r t  to  exp la in  democracy a n d /o r 
leg itim acy and to de fine  it/th e m  should th e re fo re  end w ith  the  concept 
of s ta te  w hich rende rs  i t  m ean ing fu l. W ithout a crusade (un d e rtake n  
b y  seven-m ile  boots) th ro u g h  the  h is to ry  o f p o litica l ph ilosophy o r  hesi­
ta n t steps th ro u g h  recen t ph ilosophy o f science to  re tr ie v e  th is  holy 
g ra il ,  we land in  the  qu icksands o f parad igm atic  re la t iv i ty .  Ons has to  
look a t th e  th e o re tica l fram ew ork w ith in  w hich th e  concept o f th e  sta te  
is roo ted . W ithou t d e p riv in g  anybody of academic freedom  in term s of 
his r ig h t  to  hold to  his own view  of democracy, the  concept of the 
reg s ta a t w ill be examined as an a lte rn a tive . In th is  a de libe ra te  attem pt 
is made to  avoid any possible am b igu ity  w hich has become a real danger 
in term s o f a w ord  th a t has become clichéd th ro u g h  ve rba l in f la t io n .
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2 .2  The concept o f th e  regs taa t
The concept o f th e  re g s ta a t, ju s t like  the  concept o f dem ocracy, has a 
h is to ry , a lthough the fo rm er is p ro b a b ly  o f more recent o r ig in  (R obert 
von Mohl p ro b a b ly  used the term  in 1855 fo r  the  f i r s t  t im e ), and has 
p ro b a b ly  no t, like  th e  la tte r ,  been fo rce d  in to  a popu la r leg itim is ing  
co rse t.
Neumann (1967) compares the German concept o f R echtstaat w ith  the 
Eng lish  d o c tr in e  of ru le  o f  law, and f in d s  th a t th e y  have no th ing  in 
common. The fo rm e r he ty p if ie s  as lib e ra l-c o n s titu t io n a l, because the 
n in e te e n th -c e n tu ry  German bourgeo is ie  (an econom ically u p w a rd ly  mobile 
b u t p o lit ic a lly  s tagnan t class) were sa tis fie d  w ith  the  ju r id ic a l p ro tec tion  
o f th e ir  economic lib e r tie s , and res igned them selves to  th e ir  exclusion 
from  p o litica l pw oer. The d iv is io n  o f ju r id ic a l fo rm  from  po litica l s tru c ­
tu re  o f the  s ta te  w hich cons titu tes  the core o f th is  v ie w p o in t, thus  means 
th a t th e  R ech ts taa t, as an isolated ju r id ic a l fo rm , independent o f the  
p o lit ica l s tru c tu re  of the  s ta te , had to  guaran tee  l ib e r ty  and s e c u rity . 
German libe ra lism , w hich exchanged p o litica l freedom  fo r  economic 
p ro g re ss , was th e re fo re  sa tis fied  to de fend  its  (p ro p e r ty )  r ig h ts  aga inst 
the  m onarchy, b u t d id  not w o rry  about the  conquest o f po litica l power. 
As aga inst th is  the  Eng lish  d o c trin e  (w h ich  Neumann describes as being 
d e m o c ra tic -co n s titu tio n a l)  encompasses two separate statem ents, v iz . th a t 
on th e  one hand the  parliam ent is sovere ign and th e re fo re  possesses 
le g is la tive  monopoly (dem ocratic le g itim is in g  o f p o w e r), and on the  o th e r 
hand leg is la tion  has to  comply w ith  th e  requ irem ents o f a lib e ra l legal 
system (in  the  sense o f the  "suprem acy of the  la w "). While the German 
concept of the  R ech tstaa t was not in te re s te d  in the  o r ig in  o f laws b u t in 
th e ir  in te rp re ta tio n  (n e ve r m ind the  o r ig in ) ,  the  English  bourgeo is ie  was 
in tense ly  in te re s te d  in the o r ig in  o f laws and expressed pre fe rences 
th ro u g h  pa rliam en t as a medium. E x is tin g  laws o f the  co n s titu tio n a l 
m onarchy th e  Germans merely system atized and in te rp re te d  in o rd e r to  
ren d e r a maximum of economic l ib e r ty  w ith in  a more o r  less absolute sta te . 
The basis u n d e r ly in g  d iffe re n ce  between the  E ng lish  and the German 
th e o ry  is summarise^! in the  fo llow ing  term s:
" In  the  German th e o ry  the  R echtstaa t d id  not become the spec ific  
ju r id ic a l fo rm  o f democracy as was the  case in E ng land, fo r  in the
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German concept i t  observed a much more ne u tra l stance tow ards 
the po litica l s tru c tu re "  (Neumann, 1967:27).
Because the ju r id ic a l form s w hich created the  socie ty of free  e n te rp rise  
in Germany in th e  n ineteenth  c e n tu ry  were, accord ing  to  Neumann, the 
R ec lits taa t, one could in c o rre c tly  assume th a t not on ly  in the case of th is  
view as such b u t also in terms of any fu r th e r  developm ents of the  concept 
of the  reg s ta a t any p a rt ic ip a to ry  process, which in dem ocratic term s is 
a p re re q u is ite , would be e lim inated. Th is  w rong  im pression can be c o r­
rected by p o in tin g  out tha t the concept o f the  re g s ta a t w hich Neumann 
con tras ts  w ith  the  actual English d o c trin a l concept o f ru le  o f law con­
s titu te s  o n ly  a phase in the  developm ent of th is  ideá. In the above quote 
from  Neumann i t  is also im plied th a t the  R echtstaa t in Germany and in 
England assumed d if fe re n t form s in the n ineteenth  c e n tu ry . The element 
of m u tu a lity  w hich was contained in both these form s is s itua ted  in one 
o r the  o th e r fo rm  of de lim ita tion  of the  powers of governm ent. The 
German v a ria n t th e re fo re  implies th a t a form  o f regs taa t is possible 
w ith o u t dem ocracy. W hether the obverse is also tru e  is an im portan t 
question th a t has a lready been answered in d ire c t ly  in the  section on the 
iron ies  contained in the idea of democracy.
A cco rd ing  to  Van Zyl and Van de r V y v e r  (1982) i t  is in co rre c t to  re fe r 
in term s of democracies to those states w here the le g is la tive  and execu tive  
competencies of the  governm ent are c ircum scribed  o r  held w ith in  p re ­
scribed  lim its  in the  form  of an act on Human R igh ts  (c f .  th e  USA and 
the Federal R epublic o f (West) G erm any), o r  by  co n s titu tio n a l conventions 
(c f. the  U nited K ingdom ):
"T h e  term  democracy re fe rs  to  the way in w hich the  governm ent is 
elected and not to  the size and scope of governm enta l competencies.
A dem ocra tica lly  elected governm ent and le g is la to r can, in fa c t, 
demand fo r  him self p ra c tic a lly  un lim ited  pow ers. The term  which 
to  o u r mind is the  one to use in th is  instance is reg s ta a t ( ru le  o f 
law ). The p r in c ip le  of regs taa t ind icates th a t the  governm enta l 
competencies are described  and lim ited in term s o f legal p ro v is io n s , 
w h ile  ce rta in  lib e rtie s  o f subjects ( in  re la tion  to  th e  governm ent) 
are gua ran teed" (Van Zyl and Van d e r V y v e r , 1982:460).
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From the  fo reg o in g  i t  emerges th a t these au tho rs  use the terms regs taa t 
and rule o f law in te rch a n g e a b ly . A s ig n ific a n t d iffe re n ce  between the 
v iew p o in t o f these w r ite rs  and Neumann's v iew  is th a t the  la tte r  sees 
dem ocratic leg itim iz in g  o f power as in d iv is ib ly  lin ked  to rule o f law, w hile  
Van Z y l and Van de r V y v e r 's  v iew p o in t im plies th a t democracy is not an 
essentia l o r adequate cond ition  fo r  rule o f law/regstaat, although in th e ir  
d iscussion o f genera l p rin c ip le s  of co n s titu tio n a l law fo r  a w e ll-s tru c tu re d  
s ta te  the p rin c ip le  of democracy is regarded as being fundam ental to ­
g e th e r w ith  o th e r p r in c ip le s , in c lu d in g  the p r in c ip le  o f regstaat. T hey 
g ive  no in d ica tio n , how ever, o f the  possib le connection between these two 
concepts, and an im portan t question  th a t can be asked in th is  rega rd  is 
w he the r the  lib e rtie s  of sub jects guaran teed  b y  th e  p r in c ip le  o f the 
reg s ta a t do not inc lude  the  freedom  o f shared p a rtic ip a tio n  im plied by 
p u b lic  law. Does Van Zyl and Van d e r V y v e r 's  v iew po in t im ply th a t 
democracy ( in  the  sense o f p o litica l p a rt ic ip a tio n ) does not guarantee the 
regstaat, b u t th a t the reg s ta a t guarantees democracy?
To f in d  an answer to th is  question one has to  s tu d y  th e  process o f the 
in s titu t io n a liz a tio n  of the  regstaat in h is to ry .
2.2.1 Institutionalization of the concept of the regstaat in history
T ru e  governm ent in s titu t io n s  on ly  came in to  be ing  in  Western h is to ry  
when a process o f d iffe re n tia t io n  o ccu rre d  in  societies when th e  s ta te  as 
a d iffe re n tia te d  p u b lic  legal o rd e r (re s  p u b lic a ) (a m atte r o f genera l in ­
te re s t acco rd ing  to  w hich p o litica l a u th o r ity  is seen as a p u b lic  o ffic e  and 
not as a p r iv a te  asset) assumes a place ad jacent to  non -s ta te  societal 
fo rm s. T h is  process o f d iffe re n tia tio n  im plies on the  one hand the  de ­
velopm ent o f spheres of p u b lic  and c iv il law w h ich  re s t on th e  d iv is io n  
between p u b lic  governm enta l a u th o r ity  and p r iv a te  personal r ig h ts .  On 
the  o th e r hand i t  means the  m onopolization o f governm enta l pow er o ve r 
a spec ific  area of land th ro u g h  the d e s tru c tio n  o f th e  p o litica l power 
w hich was concentra ted  in the  u n d iffe re n tia te d  t r ib a l,  c lan , fam ily  and 
medieval comm unities. In the lig h t o f th is ,  fo r  example, one can re fe r  
to  the  G reek p o l is ,  the  Roman imperinm, the  C aro ling ian  empire, and the 
B u rg u nd ia n  s ta te  (based on social es ta te ), as states w hile  the ancient 
A s ia tic  em pires, the  M eroving ian  kingdom  and the medieval feudal 
k ingdom s, not to  speak of the  ancient G reek and Roman fam ily  bonds,
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o r the Gallic tr ib e  and Germanic clans do not q u a lify  as sta tes. A ccord ing  
to llommes (1975a) the la tte r  (w h ich was a model fo r  several medieval 
cum m unities) was a socie ty in w hich the various societal forms were u n ­
d iffe re n tia te d  thus to ta lly  in te rtw in e d  in to ta lita r ia n  fash ion , so th a t it  
was not o n ly  a fam ily  community b u t also a c u lt ic ,  e n tre p re n e u ria l, 
ju r id ic a l and educative  g ro u p in g . Seeing th a t the  states mentioned above 
as examples are less d iffe re n tia te d  than the various states and societies 
w hich we know today , c lear d iffe rences  can be d isce rned . One could 
exp la in  th is  by re fe r r in g  to  the  legal and po litica l developm ent of the 
Greeks and Romans.
Between the  developments ta k in g  place in ancient Greece a fte r  the Persian 
Wars (5 th  c e n tu ry  B .C .)  and in Rome fo llow ing  the Punic Wars (3 rd  
ce n tu ry  B .C . ) ,  one can d iscern  in te re s tin g  para lle ls  in sp ite  o f obvious 
d iffe re n ce s . In both cases the re  was a developm ent from  an u n d if fe r ­
en tia ted  legal o rd e r of the  p a tr is t ic  fam ily  bonds to a d if fe re n tia tio n  be­
tween the spheres of p u b lic  and of p r iv a te  law. In G reek society the 
o ld po litica l o rgan iza tion  which rested on descent was replaced b y  the 
te r r ito r ia l po litica l o rgan iza tion  o f the  polis, and in the d iffe re n tia te d  
legal o rd e r of the  polis one could speak of "p u b lic  and c iv il law" 
(Homines, 1975b:67), a lthough the la tte r  was not ye t q u ite  on the  level 
o f the Roman ius gentium. A p a rt from  the small g ro u p  o f free  c itizens 
who occupied themselves w ith  m atters of sta te , the re  were slaves and 
in h a b itan ts  who had no c iv il r ig h ts . The Greeks had to  sac rifice  all o f 
th e ir  lives to  the Greek polis, which they  experienced as an 
a ll-encom passing re lig ious com m unity, and freedom meant th a t they  could 
devote  themselves to  m atters of governm ent - fo r  m ateria l considera tions 
were not a p re p e q u is ite  any longer fo r  fu ll c it ize n sh ip . In the  golden 
age of Greek c u ltu re  the u n d iffe re n tia te d  re la tionsh ips which 
cha rac te rised  the  whole of G reek society p r io r  to  the  advent o f the 
dem ocratic polis remained as a c h a ra c te r is tic  o f the  Greek household. 
There  was no question o f d iffe re n tia te d  non-s ta te  societal forms and the 
concom itant p riv a te  law as we know i t  in a modern d iffe re n tia te d  socie ty . 
Among the Romans, too, the  d if fe re n tia tio n  o f the  p r iv a te  and the  pub lic  
spheres d id  not mean the d if fe re n tia t io n  of the non-s ta te  societal forms 
and the coming in to  being of d iffe re n tia te d  spheres o f p r iv a te  law. Be­
fo re  the sta te  developed in Roman society as a p u b lic  legal o rd e r on ly  
the old ius civile ex is ted  which on ly  app lied to Roman c itizens and w ith in
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w hich th e re  was a d is t in c tio n  d raw n between p u b lic  and p r iv a te  law 
(w h ich  rested on, re sp e c tive ly , the  national comm unity and the 
familia), although th e re  could be no question o f d iffe re n tia te d  p u b lic  
and c iv il law. The detachm ent o f the  Roman sta te  from  the 
in te rw ovenness w ith  the  p a tr is t ic  fam ily  bonds (gentes) also does not 
mean on ly  th a t the  p o litica l power of the  la tte r  was b roken down, b u t 
also th a t these bonds resolved in to  the  Roman familia (househo ld ) which 
was, in accordance w ith  the  u n d iffe re n tia te d  fam ily  and t r ib a l bonds, at 
one and the  same time re lig io u s , e n tre p re n e u r ia l, fam ily  and po litica l 
bonds in em bryo. A cco rd ing  to  Van Zyl (1977,1979) the competencies 
o f the  pater familias, who was the  head o f the  household, held sway ove r 
the  persons who stood under his patriapote.stas, ánd they  were cons id ­
e rab le , as he o r ig in a lly  had the  power o ve r life  and death (vitae 
necisque) ove r them. His sphere o f power was not on ly  absolute in the 
sense o f the  te r r ito r ia l ju r is d ic t io n  o ve r the  land owned by the  familia, 
b u t is was also s h a rp ly  de lim ited  as aga inst the ju r is d ic t io n  of the  sta te . 
N ext to  the d iffe re n tia tio n  of the sta te  as res publica, the  o r ig in  of the  
ius gentium (from  the  th ird  c e n tu ry  B .C . onw ards) was perhaps the most 
im portan t developm ent in term s o f the  concept of the  regstaat, seeing 
th a t i t  was the unm istakeable p re c u rs o r of the  modern d iffe re n tia te d  c iv il 
law w hich is based on the  fundam ental human r ig h ts  o f c iv il l ib e r ty  ( i r ­
respective  o f n a tio n a lity , p u b lic  legal s ta tu s , race, c reed , e tc .)  o f all 
people w ith in  the  te r r i to r y  of the  s ta te . Mekkes (1940) is of the opin ion 
th a t the developm ent of the ius gentium (u n d e r the  gu idance o f Stoic 
ph ilo so p hy ) w ith  its  c iv il law concept o f cosmopolitan e q u a lity  of all free  
people as legal sub jects in th e ir  in d iv id u a l ju r id ic a l ac tions, w ith o u t 
re fe rence  to  th e ir  be ing p a rt o f a national com m unity, is o f w orld  h is ­
to ric a l s ign ificance . A cco rd ing  to Van Z y l (1977, 1979) the  Roman praetor 
(an o ffic ia l who was responsib le  fo r  c iv il ju d ic a tu re ) o ften  re ve rte d  to 
the  ius gentium to  e ffe c t a more e las tic  app lica tion  o f the  s t r ic t  ius 
civile. Van Zyl calls th is  a s o rt o f law of na tions, w hich was based on 
n a tu ra l fa irness and w hich developed w ith  the expansion o f the Roman 
te r r ito r ie s  and Rome's dominium o ve r o th e r peoples. The im portance of 
the  ius gentium (as p re c u rs o r o f c iv il law) fo r  the  la te r legal developm ent 
in Western Europe should not be under-es tim a ted . With the  abo lition  of 
the  obsolesecent form s of the  ius civile i t  was cod ified  in the  s ix th  
c e n tu ry  B .C . by  Ju s tin ia n  in the Corpus Iuris Civilis, and w ith  the 
reception o f Roman law (espec ia lly  th ro u g h  th is  p rocessing  of the  ius
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gentium by the pos t-g lossa rians o r commentators of the  15th and 16th 
ce n tu rie s ) i t  en tered in to  Western European law. T h is  co n trib u te d  
g re a tly  to  the  developm ent of a d iffe re n tia te d  c iv il law in these co u n trie s , 
especia lly under the  in fluence  o f the French Declaration of the  R ights 
o f Man and of C itizen of 1789:
" I t  would be one-s ided to  deny the  huge im portance fo the d e c la ­
ra t io n  des d ro its  de l'homme e t du c ito ye n  fo r  the  emergence of 
the  modern concept of c iv il law as essential fa c to r in the  modern 
concept o f the re g s ta a t. In th is  regard  Rousseau was p robab ly  
not the s ing le  g u id in g  s ta r. More lik e ly  i t  would be rega rded , in 
th is  sense, as the  resu lts  of a s tru g g le  begun w ith  Hugo de G root 
o f the  Humanist concept o f the d o c trin e  of the  law o f na tu re  in 
opposition  to the u n d iffe re n tia te d  Germanic legal re lations and 
bonds, u nder the  impetus of the  idea o f the  classical Roman ius 
gentium" (M ekkes, 1940:335,336).
The most im portan t facets o f the  concept o f th e  reg s ta a t w h ich thus 
emerge in th e  Greek and Roman law and sta te  developm ent are the  
in s titu tio n a lis a tio n  of the  idea th a t the  s ta te  is a res p u b lic a , and the 
concom itant d iv is io n  o f p u b lic  law (th e  in te rn a l o f the  s ta te ), c iv il law 
and p r iv a te  law. A lthough  th e re  could not y e t be a d iffe re n tia te d  p riv a te  
law (th e  in te rn a l law o f non -s ta te  societal fo rm s) the  developm ent o f the  
ius  gentium was an im portan t m ilestone in  th e  developm ent o f a d if fe re n ­
tia te d  c iv il law (w h ich  regu la ted  the  fre e  and equal legal t r a f f ic  between 
in d iv id u a ls  and societal form s w ith in  the  te r r i to r y  o f th e  s ta te ).
T h is  excu rs io n  in to  the  h is to ry  o f the  law sta te  developm ent ind ica tes th a t 
the concept o f the re g s ta a t ( th a t is , th e  idea th a t th e  sta te  as res publica 
has to s tand  under the  gu idance o f a p u b lic  concept o f ju s tic e ) has clear 
roots in th is  h is to ry . A cco rd in g ly  we w ill look at the  re la tions between 
democracy (p o litic a l p a rtic ip a tio n ) and the  re g s ta a t.
2 .2 .2  The re g s ta a t preceding democracy in  England
In th is  co n tex t Mekkes (1940) makes a d is tin c tio n  between 
fo rm a l-o rgan iza tiona l and m ateria l elements in  the  concept o f the  
re g s ta a t, fo r  the  modern state acco rd ing  to  the  reg s ta a t as i t  has de-
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veloped in  England to  his m ind reveals b o th . The fo rm er touches on the 
v a ria b le  o rgan iza tion  and societal fo rm  o f governm ent and presupposes 
as such the  la tte r  w h ich is d ire c te d  a t the  m ateria l ju r id ic a l p r in c ip le s , 
w h ich  are rea lised w ith in  th is  o rgan iza tiona l fo rm . In th e  m ateria l sense 
i t  s tru c tu re s , in th e  negative  sense, the  lim its  o f legal competence o f the  
s ta te  w ith  reg a rd  to  th e  non -s ta te  societal form s (m a rriage , fa m ily , en ­
te rp r is e ,  u n iv e rs ity ,  tenn is  c lu b , e tc .)  and in the  p o s itive  sense w ith  
the  a c tiv it ie s  o f the  sta te  in  genera l and to  its  p u b lic  ju r id ic a l and c iv il 
legal fo rm ation  o f ju s tic e .
In his in ve s tig a tion  o f the  in s titu t io n a liz a tio n  o f the  f i r s t  modern man­
ife s ta tion  o f the  re g s ta a t ( in  Eng land) Mekkes lo o ks 'a t the  form al elements 
( th e  developm ent o f the  governm enta l in s t itu t io n s )  and th e  m ateria l e le­
ments ( th e  guaran tee  o f human r ig h ts ) .  As rega rds  the  le g is la tive  
pow er, ru le  o f law came in to  be ing  in a sense w ith  the  "Long  Parliam ent" 
in  th e  form al sense in  th e  fo rm  o f a democracy w hich degenera ted , how­
e v e r, when parliam ent acted in co n tra ve n tio n  o f th e  "A greem ent o f the  
people" w h ich  was subm itted  to  th e  House o f Commons in 1649. In th is  
document the  fo llow ing  m ateria l p r in c ip le s  o f th e  re g s ta a t came to  e x ­
pression w hich are represen ted  as "n a tiv e  r ig h ts "  o f the  E nglish  na tion, 
and to w h ich , acco rd ing  to  th is  docum ent, a governm ent shou ld  d ire c t 
its e lf :  personal l ib e r ty ,  l ib e r ty  o f conscience, e q u a lity  be fo re  th e  law 
and lim ited sessions of pa rliam en t. As aga inst parliam ent th a t w ished to 
concentra te  all power w ith in  its e lf ,  th e  d ic ta to r  Cromwell in te rceded  fo r  
the  national lib e rtie s  w h ile  he v o lu n ta r ily  lim ited  h im self in term s o f his 
competencies by  a co n s titu tio n  th a t he h im self ca lled in to  be ing and in 
w hich p ro v is ion  was made at the fundam enta l level fo r  the  d iv is io n  o f 
le g is la tive  and execu tive  pow ers. A lth o u g h  he had the  o p p o r tu n ity  to  
take o ve r the  le g is la tive  pow er he d id  not t r y  to  do i t  b u t d e lib e ra te ly  
in tro d u ce d  the d iv is io n  between le g is la tive  and execu tive  pow er seeing 
th a t he had the  r ig h t  to  p rom ulgate  o rd inances ou ts ide  the  times o f ses­
sion of pa rliam en t on cond ition  th a t pa rliam en t w ould  la te r have to  ra t ify  
these. In o th e r cases pa rliam en t had to  subm it, in term s o f a rt ic le  24 
o f th e  c o n s titu tio n , its  p ro v is ion a l acts to  the  Lord  P ro te c to r, and i f  he 
d id  not w ith in  tw e n ty  days g ive  his a p p ro va l, these w ould become law if  
th e y  were not in  co n tra ve n tio n  o f th e  c o n s titu tio n . The s tru g g le  w ith  
pa rliam en t ( in  the  course o f w h ich  tw o fu r th e r  parliam ents fe ll)  ended 
p ro v is io n a lly  w ith  the  death o f Cromwell and the  re s to ra tio n  o f C harles
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II u n d e r whose re ign  the  famous Habeas Corpus Act o f 1679 was 
p rom ulga ted . The e ffo r ts  under C harles II and his successor James II 
to  re in tro d u ce  absolutism  ended w ith  the  "G lo rious R evo lu tion " o f 1689 
th ro u g h  w hich the  co n s titu tio n a l m onarchy was es tab lished , w ith  as its  
re s u lt no t on ly  the  assurance o f in d iv id u a l r ig h ts  o f freedom  in c iv il 
r ig h ts  and in c rim ina l law u nder the  ru le  o f law , b u t also the  c o n s titu ­
tiona l r ig h ts  of pa rliam en t. The developm ent of the  actual system of 
pa rliam en ta ry  democracy ( in  the  modern sense o f th e  in d iv id u a l po litica l 
lib e r tie s  o f the Eng lish  c it iz e n ) would o n ly  take place in  th e  subsequent 
pe riod  th ro u g h  the  establishm ent o f th e  freedom  o f the  p r in t in g  p ress, 
freedom  of p e tit io n , r ig h t  to  association and m eeting as well as the  
fran ch ise  (w h ich  u n til 1832 was lim ited to  the a r is to c ra c y ). In  England 
the  concept of the regstaat was th u s  la rg e ly  in s titu tio n a lis e d  before  
pa rliam en ta ry  democracy in th e  modern sense o f the  w ord  developed.
T h is  c ross-sec tion  from  English  po litica l h is to ry  ind ica tes , th e re fo re , th a t 
democracy is not an essentia l o r  adequate p re re q u is ite  fo r  the  
in s titu tio n a liz a tio n  o f th e  concept o f the  re g s ta a t, a lthough  th e  la tte r  can 
make an im portan t c o n trib u tio n  to  the  establishm ent o f the  fo rm er th ro u g h  
the  developm ent of a mutual p a rt ic ip a to ry  p o litica l c u ltu re  among a ll the  
c itizens  of the  sta te .
3. REFORM OPTIONS/STRATEGIES
The d ia logue about and the  demands fo r  p o lit ica l re fo rm ation  in  South 
A fr ic a  w ill be w ith  us fo r  a long tim e, and i t  would seem as i f  P rice 's 
v iew  of f iv e  years ago w ill be va lid  fo r  much longe r than  the  n e x t f iv e  
years s t i l l :
"C u r re n t ly  when a tte n tio n  is focused on th e  R epublic o f South 
A fr ic a , p o litica l change is almost in e v ita b ly  the  sub ject o f d is ­
cussion . Fore ign governm ents claim to  des ire  i t  and sometimes to 
re q u ire  i t ;  spokesmen fo r  the  A fr ic a n , C o lo red , and Ind ian  popu­
la tions th a t c o n s titu te  fo u r - f i f th s  o f the R epub lic 's  popu la tion  de ­
mand i t ;  the  N a tiona lis t governm ent o f the  c o u n try  a lte rn a tiv e ly  
prom ises and proclaim s i t ;  sym pathetic  o b se rve rs  de tec t i t ,  w h ile  
th e ir  more c r it ic a l colleagues deny i t "  (P rice , 1980:297).
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W ith rega rd  to  possib le  re fo rm  op tions and th e ir  even tua l implementation 
b y  the  gove rnm ent, one can ask w h e th e r, lik e  f iv e  years ago, th re e  main 
s tra teg ies  can s t i l l  be d is tin g u is h e d . Du T o it (1980, 1980b) and Giliomee 
(1980) then  d is tin g u ish e d  between
• W h ite /A fr ik a n e r  dom ination ;
• hegemony w ith  in d ire c t c o n tro l; and
• tru e  power sh a rin g  fo llow ing  negotia tion .
Seeing th a t the governm ent w ith  the new c o n s titu tio n  moved from  th e  f i r s t  
to  the  second s tra te g y , a movement back to the  f i r s t  s tra te g y  w ould mean 
regression  which would p ro b a b ly  on ly  take place shou ld  the  conserva tives 
in the  National P a rty  gain the u pper hand o r  the  p a rtie s  to  the  r ig h t  of 
the  NP come in to  pw oer. The reduction  of the  num ber o f choices from  
th re e  to two c e n tra lly  poses the  question  of the p ro b a b ility  o f a tra n s itio n  
to  the th ird  s tra te g y . T h is  question  has a lready been asked: " Is  the re  
any p rospect o f sham consociation deve lop ing  in to  genu ine  consociation 
in the  long ru n ? ” (H anf et a l. ,  1981:418). More im p orta n t here are the 
questions as to  w he ther the governm ent, w ith  reg a rd  to  th e  Black people, 
th in k s  in consocia tive  terms at a ll, and w h e th e r the  concept of 
consocia tive  democracy has not a lready  been so d isc re d ite d  in th e  new 
co n s titu tio n a l d ispos ition  th a t any movement in th a t d ire c tio n  w ould be 
fu t i le .  A bout the absence o f im p orta n t cond itions  fo r  consocia tive  de ­
m ocracy in South A fr ic a , as w ell as th e  lack o f c ru c ia l, key c h a ra c te r­
is tic s  o f i t  in the  new co n s titu tio n a l d ispos ition  a g re a t deal has a lready 
been w r it te n :  Boulle (1980, 1984); Hanf et a l . ,  (1981); Schlemmer 
(1978); S labbert (1983) and V e n te r (1982).
Seeing th a t i t  is the  Botha governm ent w hich disposes o f the  key to 
p o lit ica l re fo rm , it  is o f g re a t im portance , in the  cons ide ra tion  o f the 
op tions fo r  re fo rm , to  know what the  ideal o f re fo rm  is w h ich gu ides and 
in fo rm s the  re fo rm . Should Giliomee be r ig h t  in his v iew  th a t in th e  fin a l 
ana lys is  th e  concern is fo r  A fr ika n e rs /W h ite s  to  make an e f fo r t  to  share 
pow er w ith o u t los ing  c o n tro l, h is summary o f the  developm ents in  South 
A fr ic a  are p ro b a b ly  spot on:
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"South  A fr ic a  is s low ly m oving from  a racial o lig a rch y  to a 
m u lti-ra c ia l o lig a rch y  w ith  the A fr ik a n e rs  s t i l l  predom inant p o li­
t ic a lly "  (Giliomee, 1984:29).
His view implies th a t the  governm ent has remained s tuck at the  second 
view expressed above, and th a t one cannot so much speak of an ideal 
o f reform  as of "a bottom lin e " . Reference has a lready been made to the 
s im ila rity  w ith  the absence of a tru e  ideal o f re form  and the  resu lts  i t  
had fo r  C za ris t Russia.
Should Giliomee be w rong and one can speak of an ideal o f re form  o r a 
w illingness to  f in d  a m eaningfu l ideal o f re fo rm , the  idea of the  reg s ta a t 
can make a c ruc ia l c o n tr ib u tio n . The obstacles in the  way of the  
in s titu tio n a liz a tio n  of such an ideal o f re fo rm , how ever, are many and 
le g io n .
4. OBSTACLES IN THE WAV OF REFORM 
O nly a few of these obstacles w ill be re fe rre d  to :
4.1 U n rea lis tic  p o litica l demands
As a re s u lt, amonst o th e rs , o f d iffe rences  in p r iv ile g e  and the concom­
ita n t p o la riza tio n , the re  is a s tron g  d ive rgence  both as regards the  e x ­
periences o f the p resen t s itua tion  and the ideas held by  Whites and Blacks 
about what the s itua tion  should be in fu tu re .  The "u n re a lis t ic "  po litica l 
demands of the  Blacks feed fears on the  side of the  W hites. From the 
processing  of th e  data (Van N ie ke rk , 1984) o f m u lti-p u rp o se  su rveys 
(M PS/O V/56 and M PS/OV/71) done by the  HSRC fo r  the  
In te rg ro u p -R e la tio n s  P ro ject, i t  emerges th a t B lack people not o n ly  e x ­
perience p resen t events much more nega tive ly  than Whites b u t also feel 
much more negative  about the  d irec tio n  in w hich events are m oving than 
W hites do.
4 .2  Polarization and the  c ro s s - f ire  of the  d o u b le -b in d  dilemma
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A cco rd ing  to  Du T o it (1980a), Giliomee (1980), Adam (1980) and S labbert 
(1983) th is  dilemma means th a t leaders have to  do w ith  tw o fro n ts . When 
th e y  w ish to  negotia te  w ith  the  leaders o f o th e r g ro u p s , th e y  run  in to  
d if f ic u lt ie s  w ith  th e ir  constituenc ies  because o f p o la riza tio n . T ha t th is  
dilemma has been ope ra tive  in  South A fr ic a  fo r  some time emerges from  
the  statem ent taken  from  the  f i r s t  ha lf o f th e  seven ties:
"P resen t leaders o f th e  ce n tra l gove rnm ent are  caught in the 
c ro s s - f ire  o f m ain ta in ing  leg itim acy in  th e  eyes o f th e  e lectora te  
and accommodating b lack demands. P resent b lack leaders, too, are 
caught in  a c ro s s - f ire  o f vo ic in g  b lack g rievances and conform ing 
to the  p o licy  o f separate developm ent. In  a c r is is  s itu a tio n  these 
c ro s s -f ire s  w ill in te n s ify "  (B e k k e r, 1973:10).
4 .3  The Janus faces o f re form
The va rious g ro u p s , as well as the  g ro u p in g s  w ith in  each g ro u p s , notice 
va rious  sides of the  re fo rm  process in South A fr ic a . T h is  obstacle goes 
to g e th e r w ith  the  p rev ious two and c o n tr ib u te s  to  an in te n s ifica tio n  o f 
the  in te rp o la r iza tio n  and in tra p o la r iz a tio n .
4 .4  The absence of com prehensive, a ll-encom passing ideals o f re form
The lack o f c la r ity  about o r absence o f g u id in g  ideals fo r  reform  do not 
on ly  c o n tr ib u te  to  fears about the fu tu re ,  b u t also cloud the  p resent 
reform s w ith  m is tru s t and scepticism .
5. IN S T ITU T IO N A LIZA T IO N  OF THE REGSTAAT IN SOUTH AFR IC A:
POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE IMPASSE
In the  lig h t  of the  iron ies  contained in the  rea lisa tion  of the democratic 
idea l, w hich o ften  does not comply w ith  the  tense expecta tions o f the  
p a rt ic ip a n ts , the concept of the reg s ta a t was s tud ied  as an "o v e rr id in g  
purpose  o r tran sce n d in g  va lue" fo r  re fo rm  in South A fr ic a . Im portant 
facets of the  concept of the reg s ta a t emerge in the  developm ent of the  
G reek and Roman concept o f sta te  and law w ith  the in s titu tio n a liz a tio n
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of the  idea th a t the state is a res publica and especia lly  u nder the  in ­
fluence of the Roman ius g e n U u m  via the reception of the  Roman law in 
Western European developm ent o f s ta te  and law in th e  developm ent o f 
modern d iffe re n tia te d  c iv il law based on the  fundam ental human r ig h ts  
of c iv il l ib e r ty  and e q u a lity  ( independent of n a tio n a lity , p u b lic  legal 
s ta tu s , race, c reed , e tc .)  o f a ll people and societal form s w ith in  the 
te r r i to r y  of the  s ta te . An inve s tig a tion  o f th e  developm ent o f the  
reg s ta a t in England ind ica tes th a t the  in s titu tio n a liz a tio n  o f th e  concept 
o f the  reg s ta a t law d u r in g  the  "G lo rious  R evo lu tion ” occurs p r io r  to  the 
actual developm ent o f in d iv id u a l p o litica l r ig h ts  of the English c itize n . 
In th is  way it  becomes clear th a t the  in s titu tio n a liz a tio n  of the  regstaat 
is not rea lly  dependent on dem ocracy. While the  idea of democracy es­
pecially stresses po litica l lib e rtie s  and p a rtic ip a tio n , the concept of the 
regstuat goes much fu r th e r  and encompasses not on ly  the  sphere of pub lic  
law (w ith in  which po litica l r ig h ts  c o n s titu te  a p a rt)  b u t also the sphere 
of c iv il law and the cu rta ilm e n t of the power of governm ent w ith  respect 
to  the sphere of in te rn a l ju r is d ic t io n  of the  non -s ta te  societal form s. 
Because of the  problems w hich co n fro n t reform  in South A fr ic a , the  em­
phasis on immediate p o litica l r ig h ts  can be co u n te r-p ro d u c tiv e  to the 
in s titu tio n a liz a tio n  of the ru le  of law. The concept of the  re g s ta a t, w hich 
can be contained in a decla ra tion  o f in te n t, would lin k  reform  in  South 
A fr ic a  to  c r ite r ia  o f freedom  w hich should be acceptable to  all g roups and 
in d iv id u a ls . W ith the concept of th e  re g s ta a t as an ideal o f re fo rm  which 
should also gu ide  the  immediate reform s o f the  p resen t governm ent, ne­
go tia tion  can be conducted in  a more re laxed and less po la rised  atmos­
phere  not on ly  w ith  reg a rd  to  the  in s titu tio n a liz a tio n  o f the  reg s ta a t b u t 
also in term s of even tua l time schedules.
In  th e  te rm ino logy o f systems th e o ry  th e  fo reg o in g  can be fo rm u la ted  as 
fo llow s: In a deeply d iv id e d , po la rized  deve lop ing  soc ie ty , in  w h ich the re  
is no question  o f a homogeneous p a rtic ip a to ry  p o litica l c u ltu re , i t  can 
be c o u n te r-p ro d u c tiv e  to  s ta r t  w ith  immediate reform s on the  in p u t side 
o f th e  p o litica l system. When rad ica l reform s under th e  gu idance o f an 
encompassing ideal o f re form  ( fo r  example, th e  concept o f th e  re g s ta a t) 
and accompanied by a time schedule (w h ich  issues fo r th  from  negotia tions) 
are s ta rte d  from  the  o u tp u t s ide , the  co n tr ib u tio n s  w hich are made in 
th is  way tow ards the  developm ent o f a homogeneous, p a rt ic ip a to ry  p o li­
t ica l c u ltu re  can make the  in p u ts  o f p o litica l p a rtic ip a n ts  more m ean ing fu l.
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The concept o f th e  re g s ta a t can then  se rve  as a c r ite r io n  to  place reform s 
a lready e ffe c tiv e  in to  pe rsp e c tive  and be a g u id e lin e  fo r  th e  re - in s t itu t io n  
and the  fu l l  deploym ent o f the elements o f the  concept o f the  reg s ta a t 
w h ich was abolished p r io r  to  and fo llow ing  1948 in South A fr ic a , especia lly  
in  the  fo rm  o f racia l d isc rim in a tio n .
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